Abstract In this paper, we study Mean Field Games with common noise based on nonlinear stable-like processes. The MFG limit is specified by a single quasi-linear deterministic infinite-dimensional partial differential second order backward equation. The main result is that any its solution provides an 1/N -Nash equilibrium for the initial game of N agents. Our approach is based on interpreting the common noise as a kind of binary interaction of agents and our previous results on regularity and sensitivity with respect to the initial conditions of the solution to the nonlinear stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type generated by stable-like processes.
Introduction
Mean field games with common noise present a quickly developing part of the mean field game theory. The theory of mean field games was initiated by Lasry-Lions [28] and Huang-Malhame-Caines [19, 17, 18] , see [5, 6, 14, 15, 7, 8, 3, 4] for recent surveys, as well as [9, 10, 16, 2] and references therein. Notice that there is quite an extensive literature on the mean field games with common noise (e.g. [11, 12, 27, 23, 24, 13, 1] and references therein).
Seemingly first serious contributions to the general theory of mean field games with common noise are the works [12] and [27] . In [12] , existence of weak solutions for mean field games with common noise is shown to hold under very general assumptions, existence and uniqueness of a strong solution are proved under additional assumptions. However, [12] and [27] work mostly with controlled SDEs. Another approach which based on the sensitivity analysis for McKean-Vlasov SPDEs was developed in the papers [23, 24] . Some simple concrete models of mean field game types with common noise applied to modeling interbank loans are analyzed in detail in [13] . A model of common noise with constant coefficients is discussed in [1] .
Another new trend concerns the theory of mean field games with a major player, see [29, 30, 31] , and references therein. Common noise can be considered as a kind of neutral major player, but the usual setting for the latter [29] introduces the corresponding noise into the coefficients of the SDEs of the minor players, rather than adding additional common stochastic differential. One of the ideas (and results) of our contribution is to use the method of stochastic characteristics to link these two models. 
where all X 
depending on the action of other players, with the given functions J and V T . The coefficient b (x, µ, u) is a function of x ∈ R d , u ∈ U and a measure µ ∈ M(R d ), and µ N t in (1) is
Here U is a closed interval in R and M(R d ) is the set of bounded positive Borel measures on R d . In general, the function b needs to be defined only for µ from the set of probability measures P(R d ). However, to use smoothness with respect to µ it is convenient (though not necessary) to have this function defined on a larger space. In the usual examples, b depend on µ via a finite set of moments of type
with some bounded measurable symmetric functionsF j . As shown below, under appropriate regularity assumptions on the coefficients b, σ com and a in (1), the corresponding Markov evolution of the empirical measures µ N t converges, as N → ∞ to the unique solution µ t of the following nonlinear stochastic partial differential equation of the McKean-Vlasov type generated by the stable-like process,
This equation is written in the weak form meaning that it should hold for all
is the generator for the stable-like processes in
Recall that the fractional Laplacian can be expressed via the integral operator
with a certain constant C α . Let us introduce the following conditions: 
and satisfies the inequalities 
for any λ > 0, the classes of functions
are introduced below. Recall now that the optimal control problem facing each player, say X 1 t , is to minimize cost (2) . Now the crucial difference with the games without common noise starts to reveal itself. For games without noise, one expects to get a deterministic curve µ t in the limit of large N , so that in the limit, each player should solve a usual optimization problem for a stable-like process in R d . Here the limit is stochastic, and thus even in the limit the optimization problem faced by each player is an optimization with respect to an infinite-dimensional, in fact measure-valued, process.
In fact, for fixed N , if all players, apart from the first one, are using the same control u com (t, x, µ), the optimal payoff for the first player is found from the HJB equation for the stable-like process governed by (1) , that is, the HJB equation (where we denote
As will be shown, in the limit when (δ x1 + · · · + δ x N )/N converge to the process µ t , this equation turns to the limiting HJB equation
where the operator Λ lim acting on the variable µ is calculated in (48) with u com as the control. If J is convex, the infimum here is achieved on the single point
Moreover, ifû ind (t, x, µ) belongs to the internal part of U then
Instead of a pair of coupled forward-backward equations in the usual MFG we have now one single infinitedimensional equation (10) . Namely, for any curve u com (t, x, µ) (defining Λ lim in (48) and thus in (10)), we should solve equation (10) with a given terminal condition leading to the optimal control (11) . The key MFG consistency requirement is now given by the equationû
This can be interpreted as having a limiting game of two players, a tagged player and a measure-valued player, for which we are looking for a symmetric Nash equilibrium (see e.g. [32] ).
Equivalently, the MFG consistency (12) can be encoded into a single quasi-linear deterministic infinitedimensional partial differential second order backward equation on the function V (t, x, µ), which we present now in full substituting Λ lim from (48) and (12) in (10):
with a given terminal condition
The MFG methodology suggests that for large N the optimal behavior of players arises from the controlû given by (11) with V solving (13), or equivalently, satisfying the consistency condition (12) .
In this paper, we are going to concentrate exclusively on proving that the solutions to MFG provide the ϵ(N )-Nash-equilibria error-order ϵ(N ) ∼ 1/N . Our approach will be based on interpreting (by means of Ito's formula) the common noise as a kind of binary interaction of agents (in addition to the usual mean field interaction of the standard situation without common noise) and then reducing the problem to the sensitivity analysis for McKeanVlasov type SPDE.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates our main results and indicates the strategy of their proof. Sections 3-4 are devoted to the well-posedness and sensitivity analysis of the McKean-Vlasov type SPDEs and the related properties of the corresponding measure-valued Markov processes. The last two Sections prove the Theorems formulated in Section 2.
The following basic notations will be used:
is the Banach space of n times continuously differentiable and bounded functions f on R d such that each derivative up to and including order n is bounded, equipped with norm ∥f ∥ C n which is the sum of the suprema of the magnitudes of all mixed derivatives up to and including order n.
is the Banach space of bounded continuous functions f :
with f and all its derivatives up to and including order n belonging to
is the Banach space of finite signed Borel measures on
of positive and positive normalized (probability) measures, respectively.
Let
denote the parts of these sets containing measures of the norm less than λ (resp. not exceeding λ or equal λ). 
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The same formula defines the variational derivative in the case when F is a Banach space-valued mapping. For instance, if F = F j is given by (3), then
denote the space of functionals such that the kth order variational derivatives are well defined and represent continuous functions of all variables with measures considered in their weak topology.
be the space of functionals such that their second order variational derivatives are continuous as functions of all variables and belong to C k×k (R 2d ) as functions of the spatial variable; the norm of this space is
denotes the usual pairing of functions and measures on R d . E denotes the expectation.
Our strategy and results
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1 Let functions b, a, u, J satisfy the Conditions (C0)-(C3), σ com be a constant d × d
′ matrix and let V (t, x, µ) be a classical solution to problem (13) , (14) . Assume V (t, x, µ), as the function of µ belongs to the space
, as the function of x belongs to the space C 2 (R d ) and its derivatives with respect to x belong to the space
. Then the profile of symmetric strategiesû t (x, µ) given by (11) is an ϵ-Nash equilibrium of the N -player game given by (1), (2), with
As an important ingredient in our proof we use our previous results on the regularity and sensitivity of the nonlinear stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type generated by stable-like processes [25] . As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain a result of independent interest, not linked with any optimization problem, namely the 1/N -rates of convergence for interacting stable-like processes to the limiting measure-valued stable-like process, Theorem 2 (often interpreted as the 'propagation of chaos' property).
Let us explain our strategy for proving Theorem 1. For any N and a fixed common strategy u t (x, µ), solutions to the system of SDEs (1) on t ∈ [0, T ] define a backward propagator (also referred in the literature as a flow or as a two-parameter semigroup) U 
is the solution to (1) at time t with the initial condition
It acts on the probability measures on R dN , so that if µ is the initial distribution of
By the standard inclusion
the set R dN is mapped to the set
respectively. On the other hand, for a fixed function u t (x, µ), the solution of SPDE (4) specifies a stochastic process, a stablelike process, on the space of probability measures
where µ s,t (µ) is the solution to (4) 
This result belongs to the statistical mechanics of interacting stable-like processes, so that its significance goes beyond any links with games or control theory.
This result is not sufficient for us, as we have to allow one of the agent to behave differently from the others. To tackle this case we shall consider the corresponding problem with a tagged agent. Namely, consider the Markov process on pairs (X 
Remark 1
The coordinates (X 
where µ = 
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where the process (X
with the initial data x, µ at time s is the solution to the system of stochastic equations
(the second equation is actually independent of the first one).
The following is the basic convergence result for the tagged processes.
Theorem 3
Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 (with both u com t , u ind t satisfying these assumptions), let
Theorem 2 is a particular case of Theorem 3 obtained from the latter by ignoring the first coordinate. However, by methodological reason, we first prove simpler Theorem 2, and then its extension Theorem 3. Now Theorem 1 can be derived.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let u 1 be any adaptive control of the first player and V 1 the corresponding payoff in the game of N players, where all other players are using u com (t, x, µ) arising from a solution to (13) , (14) . Then V 1 ≥ V 2 , where V 2 is obtained by playing optimally, that is using control u 2 arising from the solution to (9) . By Theorem 3,
where V 2,lim is obtained by playing u 2 in the limiting game specified by equations (22), (23) . But V 2,lim ≥ V , where V is the optimal payoff for the first player in the limiting game of two players, where the second, measurevalued, player uses u com . Consequently,
completing the proof. 
Sensitivity for stochastic McKean-Vlasov type equations
In this section, we formulate the well-posedness and the sensitivity results of equations (4) or (6), proved in our previous paper [25] . For any measure µ and a vector y the measure µ(. + y) denotes the measure µ shifted by y. By using the method of stochastic characteristics, equations (4) and (6) are transferred to the non-stochastic equations with random coefficients.
Namely, according to Lemma 1 of [25] , equation (6) 
Theorem 4
Let functions b, a, u satisfy the Conditions (C0)-(C3), σ com be a constant d × d ′ matrix. Then for any given T > 0 the following holds.
(i) The Cauchy problem for equation (6) 
with C depending on the bounds of the derivatives in conditions (C1)-(C3).
Denote by
and
the first and second variational derivatives of the solutions to (6) with respect to the initial data respectively.
Lemma 1
Let equation (25) be well posed and its solutions ζ t depend smoothly on the initial condition in the sense that the variational derivatives δζ t /δζ 0 (x) and δ 2 ζ/δζ 0 (x)δζ 0 (y) exist as signed measures and are continuous bounded functions of x and y. Then the solutions µ t = ζ t (x − σ com W t ) to equation (6) also depend smoothly on the initial condition µ 0 = ζ 0 and the variational derivatives are given by the formulas
Theorem 5 
for t ∈ [0, T ] uniformly for all values of W t . Moreover, the variational derivatives ξ t (x; .) are twice differentiable in x weakly, as the functionals on the spaces of smooth functions, that is,
again uniformly for all values of the noise W t .
Theorem 6
Then the mapping Y = µ 0 → µ t from Theorem 4 is twice continuously differentiable in Y , so that the derivative η t (x, z; .) is well defined as a continuous function of three variables such that
for t ∈ [0, T ] uniformly for all values of W t . Moreover, the derivatives of η t (x, z; .) with respect to x and z of order at most one are well-defined as elements
for γ, β = 0, 1.
On the domain of the Markov semigroups generated by the McKean-Vlasov type SPDEs
The solutions of equation (6) define a Markov process, in fact a measure-valued stable-like process. The corresponding Markov propagator is given on the continuous functionals of measures in the usual way:
where µ t is the solution to (6) for t > s with given µ = µ s at time s. The main conclusion we need from the sensitivity analysis developed above is the invariance of the set of smooth functionals under this propagator, that is the following fact:
Theorem 7
Under assumption of Theorem 6 the spaces of functionals C 1,2 (M ≤λ (R d )) and its intersection with
are invariant under the action of the operators (37), so that
with a constant C(T ).
Proof
it follows that
It follows from Theorem 6 and the formula
leading to (39).
Proof of Theorem 2
Let us return to our initial equation (1) . Under the conditions (C0)-(C3) and the constant correlations σ com , equation (1) is well-posed in R dN and specifies a Feller stable-like process and the corresponding backward and forward propagators U N , V N given by (15) , (16) . We are interested in the limit of this stable-like process as N → ∞.
Applying Ito's formula we obtain the generator of the stable-like process specified by (1) :
where 
Here and everywhere by a time-dependent generator, say A N above, of a non-homogeneous Markov process we mean a time-dependent family of operators such that for f from some invariant dense subspace of bounded continuous functions the equation
N f holds for s ≤ t. In the case of the N -particle stable-like process, the invariant subspace can be usually taken to be the space of twice differentiable functions (which are invariant if σ and b are twice and once differentiable respectively). In the case of the limiting measure-valued process the invariant domains will be given by the subspaces C 2,k×k (M ≤λ (R d )). The first term in (40) can be considered as describing a stable-like process arising from the system of particles with a mean field interaction and the second term as giving an additional binary interaction (though not of a standard potential type that can be easily included in the mean field interaction).
By inclusion (17), the process specified by (40) can be equivalently considered as a measure-valued process defined on the set of linear combinations P N (R d ) of the Dirac atomic measures. On the level of propagators this correspondence arises from the identification of symmetric functions f on R dN with the functionals
To recalculate the generator (40) in terms of functionals F on measures we use the following simple formulas for differentiation of functionals on measures (proofs can be found e.g. in [21] ):
Applying these formulas in conjunction with the obvious identity
leads to the following expression of A N in terms of F (µ):
with
and 
Proof of Theorem 3
The well-posedness of the process on pairs (x, µ) solving equations (22) and (23) is straightforward once the wellposedness of the process solving (23) is proved, because equation (23) does not depend on x, and once it is solved, equation (22) is just a usual Ito's equation. Straightforward extension of the above calculations for the generator of the process solving (23) shows that the process solving (22)- (23) is generated by the operator
where Λ lim is given by (48) and acts on the variable µ, 
and with the same correction term (49). Thus the proof of Theorem 3 is the same as for Theorem 2.
Conclusion
Mean field games with common noise based on nonlinear stable-like processes are studied in this paper. We consider the common noise as a multidimensional noise with constant correlations. The MFG limit is specified by a single quasi-linear deterministic infinite-dimensional partial differential second order backward equation. The main result is that any solution of this equation provides an 1/N -Nash equilibrium for the initial game of N agents. Our approach is based on interpreting the common noise as a kind of binary interaction of agents. We use our previous results on regularity and sensitivity with respect to the initial conditions of the solution to the nonlinear stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type generated by stable-like processes.
